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Criminal and civil law differ greatly in their use of the element of in-
tent. The purposes of intent in each legal system are tailored to 
effectuate very different goals. The Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., J3J S. Ct. 2060 (20lJ), 
however, imported a criminal concept of intent-willful blindness-into 
the statute for patent infringement, a civil offense. This importation of 
a criminal law concept of intent into the patent statute is novel and 
calls for examination. This Article compares the purposes behind intent 
in criminal law with the purposes behind intent in patent law to 
demonstrate that this importation does not achieve the policy goals of 
the patent regime. Criminal law jurisprudence requires an intent ele-
ment for three reasons: to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to 
an act, to separate criminal from civil liability, and to shield otherwise 
innocently acting defendants from criminal punishment. Patent in-
fringement actions, by contrast, lack an intent element because they 
almost exclusively seek to remedy economic harms. The importation of 
criminal concepts of knowledge into the patent infringement statute 
may therefore lead to unwanted consequences, particularly, higher-
than-warranted burdens of proof for patent holders. To this end, 
equating criminal mental states to civil ones risks treating patent in-
fringement as criminal conduct. This Article concludes by proposing 
that courts should examine the purposes of mental state requirements 
on a statute-by-statute basis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While "it is true enough that civil and criminal cases do not always 
stand in bold relief to one another," I "[i]n no one thing does criminal juris-
prudence differ more from civil ... than in its different doctrine concerning 
... intent."2 The terms used to describe criminal intent are "tailored to the 
criminal law ... to require a ... criminal intent beyond the purpose other-
wise required for guilt, or an additional bad purpose, or specific intent to 
violate a known legal duty created by highly technical statutes."3 The terms 
used to describe intent in a civil violation "typically present[] neither the 
textual nor the substantive reasons for pegging the threshold of liability at 
knowledge of wrongdoing."4 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Glob-
al-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 5 violates this longstanding separation 
between criminal and civil mental states. There, the Court imported a con-
cept of willful blindness, a criminal law species of intent, into patent law, a 
solely civil field. 6 This importation continues a trend where "the distinction 
1. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,140 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 69 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting J. BISH-
OP, CRIMINAL LAW § 285 (5th ed. 1872)). 
3. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
4. Id. 
5. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
6. Id. at 2065. It should be noted that nothing in the patent statute provides criminal 
penalties for any violation of its provisions. See 35 U.s.C. §§ 281-97 (2011). 
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between criminal and civil law seems to be collapsing across a broad front."? 
A comparison of the purposes behind the intent, or mens rea, requirement in 
criminal law with the infringement statute in patent law demonstrates that 
the Court's haste in Global-Tech may lead to unwanted consequences in 
patent infringement and other civil actions. 
Generally, patent infringement is a strict liability civil offense.8 It does 
not matter whether the conduct of the alleged infringer was malicious or 
innocent of heart; the patent infringement statute imposes liability on all 
those who make, use, sell, or offer to sell a patented invention without the 
authority of the patent holder.9 In a typical action for patent infringement, 
the mental state of an accused infringer is irrelevant. 1O 
In a criminal action, however, the mental state of the defendant is all-
important. The Supreme Court has long presumed that "an injury can 
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention."'1 Without some base 
level of criminal intent, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for his 
conduct. '2 To color the appropriate mental state required for conviction, 
courts and legislators have developed a kaleidoscope of phrases and con-
cepts to describe mens rea, from "malice aforethought" to simple 
"scienter."13 Each of these has adopted a textured legal nuance, furthering 
the principal purposes of criminal law. '4 
There are generally three historical justifications for the mens rea re-
quirement in criminal law. One-mental states illustrate particular levels of 
moral culpability for their crimes. A criminal defendant who purposefully 
kills someone is more morally culpable than a defendant who does so by 
accident. ls Two-a mental state requirement allows for differentiation be-
tween criminal and civil liability for the same physical act. Federal statutes 
in securities, labor, antitrust, and even food and drug law attach mental 
states to otherwise civil offenses, primarily for the purpose of distinguishing 
what is civil and what is criminal. '6 And three-where the physical act is 
7. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal 
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991). 
8. {n re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) ("[P]atent 
infringement is a strict liability offense .... "). 
9. 35 U.S.c. § 271(a) (2011) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention ... infringes the patent."). 
10. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) 
("Application of the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringe-
ment, and neither requires proof of intent."); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 
821,832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]here is no intent element to direct infringement.") (emphasis 
omitted). 
II. 
12. 
13. 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
{d. at 250-51. 
{d. at 252. 
14. See id. 
15. See infra Part II.A. 
16. See infra Part I1.B. 
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itself innocent, mens rea requirements shield less culpable defendants from 
the maw of criminal punishmentP 
Mental states in the patent infringement statute are concerned with none 
of these justifications. They do not seek to attach moral culpability to an 
infringer.18 They have no need to differentiate civil from criminal liability 
because infringement actions are solely civil in nature-unlike hybrid civil-
criminal actions such as certain copyright violations. 19 And they do not seek 
to establish a minimum level of moral culpability to shield "innocent" in-
fringers because patent infringement actions, in fact, typically punish 
otherwise morally innocent conduct.20 Rather, the purpose of patent in-
fringement actions is almost solely economic: to allow patent holders to 
receive compensation for the unauthorized use of their inventions.21 This is 
distinct even from other traditional property torts, such as trespass or nui-
sance, which have, at their core, moral and social utilitarian functions.22 
Despite these distinctions, the Supreme Court in Global-Tech imported 
a criminal mens rea standard of willful blindness into the patent infringe-
ment statute.23 In discussing whether the inducement of patent infringement 
under 35 U .S.c. § 271 (b) requires the accused inducer to possess knowledge 
of the asserted patent, the Court answered, "Yes."24 But, in determining the 
type of knowledge required, the Court declared that a defendant must be at 
least willfully blind-as that term is understood in criminal law-to poten-
tial infringement,25 casting aside prior Federal Circuit law on the issue.26 
Though it may appear that Global-Tech is limited to inducement actions, the 
Supreme Court's approach to attaching criminal mens rea concepts to civil 
law violations suggests that the lower courts may similarly import other 
criminal mens rea standards into the infringement statute.27 
The Supreme Court's importation of a criminal mens rea standard into 
the patent infringement statute does not advance the goals of patent in-
fringement actions. Willful blindness, as imported from criminal law, 
requires a defendant's knowledge of an act's illegality as a substantive ele-
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See Mark Chandler, The Patent System's Relationship to Digital Entrepreneurship, 
112 W. VA. L. REV. 199, 202-03 (2009) (discussing the amorality of patent infringement 
suits). 
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2011) (creating civil liability for copyright infringement); id. 
§ 506 (imposing criminal penalties for willful copyright infringement). 
20. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. Infra Part III. 
23. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,2065 (2011). 
24. Id. at 2068; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2011). 
25. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
26. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(allowing a civil "knew or should have known" standard regarding potential infringement). 
27. See infra Part IV.C. 
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ment of the crime.28 The same cannot be said of actions for patent infringe-
ment, which seek only to remedy the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's 
patent.29 This apparent doctrinal movement founders for a number of rea-
sons: it disallows legitimately harmed patent holders economic 
compensation, it continues a trend of conflating criminal and civil law con-
cepts, and it fails to effectuate the diverse purposes behind the inclusion of 
mental states in civillawsuits.3o 
This Article discusses and compares the purposes behind mental states 
in criminal and patent law and argues that the importation of mental states 
from one area of the law into another, as in Global-Tech, fails to comport 
with each discipline's purposes. Part I briefly discusses the Global-Tech 
case as a focus for the discussion about the importation of criminal mental 
states into patent law. Part II examines the purposes of a mens rea require-
ment in criminal law, namely that it seeks to establish a level of immorality 
to the crime, differentiates crimes from torts premised on the same physical 
act, and establishes a minimum level of culpability to the defendant for an 
otherwise innocent act. Part ill demonstrates that the primary purpose of 
patent infringement suits is economic relief, unlike other similar property 
torts, such as trespass and nuisance, which also have moral and social utili-
tarian functions. Part IV criticizes the potential consequences of mixing 
criminal and patent mental states. The Article concludes by calling for the 
prevention of construing patent infringement as criminal conduct. 
I. GLOBAL-TECH ApPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S.A. 
Those who have attempted deep-frying at home know that it is a peri-
lous activity: deep fryers typically operate around 3IOoF,3' more than hot 
enough to cause serious burns.32 It is for this reason that French kitchenware 
company SEB S.A. began, in the 1980s, to develop an inexpensive and safe 
home deep fryer.33 In 1990, SEB was awarded with U.S. Patent No. 
4,995,312, which claimed a deep fryer that would be not only cheap, but also 
safe to the user's touch while operating.34 The fryer encased an electrically 
28. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69. 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See infra Part IV. 
31. Deep-frying is, in fact, a combination of simultaneously occurring chemical pro-
cesses, including the Maillard reaction, the combination of sugars and proteins that give fried 
food its taste and dark appearance. See MONOJ K. GUPTA, KATHLEEN WARNER & PAMELA J. 
WHITE, FRYING TECHNOLOGY AND PRACTICES 51 (2004) (discussing the chemical reactions 
accompanying deep-frying, including the Maillard reaction); JEFF POTTER, COOKING FOR 
GEEKS 205 (2010) (describing the Maillard reaction at 3IOOF). 
32. See W. Schubert, D.H. Ahrenholz and L.D. Solem, Bumsfrom Hot Oil and Grease: 
A Public Health Hazard, II J. BURN CARE REHAB. 558 (1990). 
33. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360,1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
34. U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312 col. 1 I. 37-47, col. 21. 19-24 (filed Aug. 28, 1990). 
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operated frying pan in "an inexpensive plastic outer shell, or skirt."35 More 
durable plastics could not be used because heat-resistant plastics were too 
expensive for mass manufacture.36 The elegance underlying the SEB inven-
tion was to simply suspend the frying pan on top of a thin insulating ring 
between it and the skirt, and leaving a space of air between the side of the 
pan and plastic side of the fryer housingY This is similar, perhaps, to a 
thermos.38 SEB dubbed its invention the "cool-touch" fryer, and sold it 
worldwide.39 
In 1997, SEB's competitor, Sunbeam Products, Inc., asked Pentalpha 
Enterprises, Ltd., a Hong Kong company, to supply it with "touch-safe" 
deep fryers.4o Pentalpha purchased a cool-touch fryer in Hong Kong for the 
sake of copying its design and selling it to Sunbeam.41 Because the fryer 
was sold outside the United States, however, it did not include any U.S. pa-
tent markings to alert Pentalpha that it was protected in the U.S.42 
Presumably to insulate itself from its evident plagiarism, Pentalpha hired a 
U.S. patent attorney to conduct a patent search-but never informed him 
that it copied its design from a competitor's product in Hong Kong.43 Pen-
talpha's attorney failed to find SEB's patent and determined that the fryer 
Pentalpha lifted from SEB was permissible to sell in the United States.44 
Pentalpha then sold its fryers to Sunbeam, who began selling Pentalpha's 
fryers in the United States.45 
SEB soon uncovered Pentalpha's duplicity, and in 1998, sued Sunbeam 
for patent infringement.46 Despite the lawsuit, Pentalpha boldly continued to 
sell its product to two other U.S. companies for importation: Fingerhut 
Corp. and Montgomery Ward & CO.47 After settling with Sunbeam, SEB 
then sued Pentalpha.48 
SEB's principal case against Pentalpha focused on "induced infringe-
ment" under 35 U.S.C. § 27 ] (b). That section, in its entirety, provides: 
"Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
35. Montgomery Ward, 594 F.3d at 1365. 
36. '312 Patent col. 1 I. 37-47. 
37. Id. col. I I. 55-col. 2 I. 8. 
38. Here, the frying pan is analogous to the inner container of a thermos. A vacuum, 
rather than a wall of air, sits between the inner container and the thermos housing. In both 
cases, the vacuum or air prevents the conduction of heat between the interior receptacle and 
the exterior housing. 
39. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (20\\). 
40. Id. at 2064. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. [d. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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infringer."49 The section does not define "actively induces." In the lay con-
text, inducement typically suggests a purposeful act of persuasion: "to lead 
or move by persuasion;"50 "[t]o lead (a person), by persuasion, or by some 
influence or motive that acts upon the WiII;"51 or "to move by persuasion or 
int1uence."52 But in the patent context, it was previously unclear whether the 
object of "inducement" was the act giving rise to infringement (e.g., mak-
ing, using, or selling an invention that happened to be patented)53 or 
purposeful infringement itself (specifically "persuading" another to infringe 
a patent).54 In the former scenario, a defendant would be liable for persuad-
ing or leading another to make an article that happened to be a patented 
invention. To prevail on such an inducement claim, the plaintiff would have 
only needed to prove that the defendant induced another to make the article 
at issue, and that the patent's claims read on the article. In the latter scenar-
io, however, the plaintiff would need to prove that the defendant persuaded 
another to make an article that infringed a patented invention and that the 
defendant had some knowledge, actual or constructive, that the other's act 
constituted infringement.55 
Although infringement-by-inducement has been a source of liability 
since at least 1952,56 courts did not resolve this issue until DSU Medical 
Corp. v. JMS Co. in 2006.57 There, the Federal Circuit interpreted induce-
ment as contemplating the latter scenario: the specific inducement of 
infringement.58 Infringement-by-inducement required a plaintiff to show 
"that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew 
or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements."59 The 
court further concluded that the "requirement that the alleged infringer knew 
or should have known his actions would induce actual infringement neces-
sarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the patent."60 This 
level of knowledge-that the defendant "knew or should have known his 
actions would induce actual infringements"61--echoed well-worn standards 
49. 35 U.S.c. § 27 1 (b)(201 1). 
50. Induces Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/ 
induces (last visited Aug. 09, 201l). 
51. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 887-88 (2d ed. 1989). 
52. Induces Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.comJ 
dictionary/induces (last visited June 17,20\ 2). 
53. See 35 U.S.c. § 271 (a) (2011). 
54. This is the crux of the statutory text the Supreme Court identified in Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (20\ I). 
55. See itt. at 2067. 
56. See 35 U.S.c. § 271 historical and revision notes (2011) ("One who actively induc-
es infringement as by aiding and abetting the same is liable as an infringer .... "). 
57. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
58. Id. at 1304. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. (emphasis added). 
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of "constructive knowledge,"62 and borrowed from older common law patent 
cases on the subject.63 
At trial, the jury found that Pentalpha had "actively induced" the in-
fringement of SEB's Patent, and the court granted SEB enhanced damages 
and attorney fees.64 Prejudgment interest alone totaled $1.7 million.65 On 
appeal, Pentalpha argued it did not possess the necessary intent to sustain a 
claim for infringement-by-inducement.66 Pentalpha reasoned that because it 
"had no actual knowledge of the patent during part of the time it was selling 
deep fryers to Sunbeam," it could not be said to have "actively induced" 
infringement of SEB's patent.67 The appellate court disagreed. Reading its 
prior precedent in DSU Medical,68 the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
mental state required for infringement-by-inducement was broader than "ac-
tual knowledge."69 As an example, the court borrowed the concept of 
"deliberate indifference" from Farmer v. Brennan70-a prisoner civil-rights 
Supreme Court case-to show that active inducement could be proven 
where the evidence pointed to "a subjective determination that the defendant 
knew of and disregarded the overt risk that an element of the offense exist-
ed."71 Though "no direct evidence [showed] that Pentalpha had actual 
knowledge of the patent,"72 the court concluded that "[t]he record ... con-
tain[ed] considerable evidence of deliberate indifference" to the risk of 
62. See, e.g., Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 
251 (2000) (concluding that knowledge of an illegal transfer of funds could be proven by 
"constructive knowledge," whether "the transferee (assuming he has purchased for value) 
knew or should have known of the existence of the trust and the circumstances that rendered 
the transfer in breach of the trust"); Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 
156, 178 (1981) (affirming appellate court reversal where the district court "should not itself 
have resolved, with respect to the [defendant's] actual or constructive knowledge of the condi-
tion of [a defective] winch" where "the [defendant] vessel should have known the facts" 
giving rise to its alleged defectiveness); Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) 
("[I]t is true that constructive knowledge, or the 'should-have-known' standard, is not suffi-
cient to support a finding of deliberate indifference .... "). 
63. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro If), 377 U.S. 476, 489-
90 (1964). Ironically, however, the cases cited in Aro /I to support a constructive knowledge 
theory of inducement "long recognized the fundamental proposition that '[t]o constitute an 
infringement of a patent, it is not necessary that the infringer should have known of the exist-
ence of the patent at the time he infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary 
that he should have known his doings to constitute an infringement.' " Id. at 491 n.8 (Harlan, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg, J.1., dissenting). 
64. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99 Civ. 9284 (SCR), 2008 WL 
4540416, at *1 (S.D.N.¥. Oct. 1,2008). 
65. Id. at *5. 
66. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
67. Id. at 1373. 
68. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293,1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
69. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376-77. 
70. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
71. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376. 
72. Id. at 1377. 
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infringement.73 The panel further noted that, despite its decision, "[t]his 
opinion does not purport to establish the outer limits of the type of 
knowledge needed for inducement,"74 and suggested that, in some circum-
stances, mere "constructive knowledge"-where the alleged inducer "should 
have known" of the patent15-may suffice as proof of inducement.76 Conse-
quently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue 
of inducement.77 Pentalpha then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court granted four months later.78 
The Supreme Court boiled down its review of Pentalpha's appeal to the 
question of "whether a party who 'actively induces infringement of a patent' 
under 35 U.S.c. § 271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement."79 "Finding no definitive answer in the statutory text,"80 the 
Court looked sidelong to its jurisprudence on "contributory infringement," 
that is, where a defendant offers to sell or sells a "component" of a patented 
article "constituting a material part of the invention, [and] knowing the same 
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of 
such patent."81 The Court's previous decision in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro If) elucidated that contributory in-
fringement's knowing-the-same element required specific knowledge of the 
infringed patent.82 This gloss, the Court concluded, had since "become a 
fixture in the law of contributory infringement" in the intervening half-
century.83 Concluding that both contributory and induced infringement were 
birthed from the same common law origin, the Court decided that active 
inducement similarly required knowledge of the infringed patent, finding 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 1378. 
75. [d. at 1376-77 (equating an objective "should have known" standard to constructive 
knowledge of a patent). 
76. Id. at 1378. 
77. Id. at 1381. 
78. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) (mem.). The par-
ent corporation of Pentalpha, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., replaced Pentalpha as petitioner. 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 
2060 (2011) (No. 10-6), 20 I 0 WL 2813550. 
79. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2063. 
80. Jd. at 2065. 
81. 35 U .S.c. § 271 (c) (20 II). The full text of the statute reads: "Whoever offers to sell 
or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same 
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not 
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be 
liable as a contributory infringer." !d. 
82. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 11),377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
83. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (quoting 5 R. CARL Moy, Moy's WALKER ON PA-
TENTS § 15:20 (4th ed. 2009)). 
10 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
that rare solace in "the 'special force' of the doctrine of stare decisis with 
regard to questions of statutory interpretation."84 
The Court went on to conclude that a criminal concept of willful blind-
ness should apply to accused "inducers."85 This standard, reasoned the 
Court, ensured "that defendants cannot escape the reach of statutes by delib-
erately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are 
strongly suggested by the circumstances."86 In the criminal context, the will-
ful blindness standard required proof of the defendant's subjective belief 
"that there is a high probability that a fact exists," and that the defendant 
took "deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact."87 Without any discus-
sion of how such a standard belongs in patent infringement cases, the Court 
simply referenced "the long history of willful blindness and its wide ac-
ceptance in the Federal Judiciary."88 
In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the use of recklessness and 
negligence-standards typically seen in civil cases-to prove an alleged 
inducer's mental state.89 The Court also clearly "appeal[ed] to moral theory 
by citing the 'traditional rationale' that willfully blind defendants 'are just 
as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.' "90 As Justice Kennedy, 
the lone dissenter, reminded the majority, this reasoning betrays the idea 
that moral purposes, such as retribution, "have no force in the domain of 
patent law.'>91 
There should be little confusion after Global-Tech: (1) knowledge of the 
asserted patent is required to prove induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b);92 and (2) the quantum of knowledge required for such proof is 
either the criminal concept of willful blindness or actual knowledge.93 Glob-
al-Tech also decidedly rejected previous formulations of knowledge derived 
84. Id. This may seem like a thin reed on which the Court hung its decision regarding 
whether induced infringement requires knowledge of the accused patent. The provisions have 
little overlapping language, have existed as separate statutes for over sixty years, and seem, in 
principle, to remedy different harms. As such, whatever stare decisis is due, the Court's juris-
prudence on contributory infringement should have no bearing on issues of first impression 
regarding induced infringement, no matter how late-coming they may be. 
85. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
86. Id. at 2068-69. 
87. ld. at 2070. 
88. /d. at 2069. 
89. Id. at 2070-71. 
90. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 2073. 
92. Id. at 2068 (majority opinion). 
93. Id. 
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from civil law concepts as described by the district court94 and the Federal 
Circuit.95 
This importation of criminal mens rea into the patent statute calls for 
the reexamination of mental states in the law generally. The traditional goals 
of criminal law (including moral condemnation, retribution, and rehabilita-
tion) are far different than the traditional goals of patent law (such as the 
"Progress of Science and useful Arts,"96 allowing inventors to recoup the 
costs of their invention, and clearly demarcating intellectual property lines). 
Parts II and III below explain and compare the different purposes of mental 
states in criminal and patent law. 
n. THE PURPOSE OF MENS REA IN CRIMINAL LAW 
As a general matter, all crimes are defined by two components: a bad 
physical act, the "actus reus," and a bad mental state possessed by the de-
fendant while committing the bad act, the "mens rea."97 "The existence of a 
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence."98 This rule applies both to common law 
and purely statutory crimes.99 Even where a purely statutory crime is silent 
as to mens rea, long-standing jurisprudential and philosophical concerns 
counsel courts to read one into the statute. 1oo 
94. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99 Civ. 9284, 2007 WL 3165783, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. OcL 9, 2007) (finding that SEB possessed "specific intent" to induce infringement). 
95. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (find-
ing that SEB was "deliberate[ly] indifferen[tj" to whether induced infringement had 
occurred). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
97. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148 (2007) ("[T]he general principle [is] that 
where scienter is required no crime is committed absent the requisite state of mind."); United 
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) ("In the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea 
and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur."); Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952) ("Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted 
only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand .... "). 
98. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); see also United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (quoting Dennis); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600,605 (1994) (quoting U.S. Gypsum). 
99. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,251 (1922». 
100. {d. at 606 (discussing other cases reading a mens rea requirement into a silent stat-
ute); see also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250 ("The contention that an injury can amount to a 
crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal 
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a conse-
quent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil."). 
The exception to this rule is when the statute "regulate[s] potentially harmful or injurious 
items" such that the crime is characterized as a "public welfare" offense. Staples, 511 U.S. at 
607. "In such situations, we have reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is dealing 
with a dangerous device of a character that places him in responsible relation to a public dan-
ger, he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation, and we have assumed that in 
such cases Congress intended to place the burden on the defendant to ascertain at his peril 
whether his conduct comes within the inhibition of the statute." {d. (internal quotation marks 
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Historically, there have been three principal functions of the mens rea 
requirement: (1) to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to a defendant 
who commits a particular act,IOI (2) to differentiate between those acts re-
quiring private compensation (torts) as opposed to societal retribution 
(crimes),102 and (3) "to shield people against punishment for apparently in-
nocent activity."103 Concepts, terms, and phrases describing particular 
degrees of mental states have arisen to further these goals. I04 As such, the 
terms employed by statutes and courts to define criminally culpable mental 
states have become embodied with specific and sometimes unique meanings 
in relation to the function they seek to further. 
and alterations omitted). A public-welfare-offense statute, therefore, "dispenses wi th the con-
ventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing." Id. at 606-07. 
101. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 ("A critical facet of the individualized 
determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the de-
fendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more 
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more 
severely it ought to be punished."); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 319, 319-20 (1996) ("Culpability focuses on the actor, not on the act on which 
wrongdoing focuses. More specifically, culpability focuses on the actor's mental state at the 
time of the wrongful act. Roughly, one is CUlpable if he chooses to do wrong in circumstances 
when that choice is freely made."). 
102. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between 
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1806 n.36 (1992) ("[M]ost criminal cases re-
quire proof of subjective and objective liability, whereas most civil cases require proof only of 
objective liability. Therefore, we say that the paradigmatic task of the civil law is to compen-
sate for damages caused in the normal conduct of everyday life, usually without regard to 
actual knowledge or intent."); Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controver-
sial? Four Problems Obscured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REV. 965, 978 (2002) ("The 
mental state of the accused matters because criminal liability, unlike tort liability, envisages 
punishment of the perpetrator rather than compensation of the victim."); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 
YALE LJ. 111, 116-17 (1983) ("[T]he intent requirement in [civil] equal protection cases 
should be less stringent than that employed in criminal prosecutions" because "criminal law 
does not attempt to restore victims to the position they occupied before the commission of the 
crime; rather, it leaves such attempts to civil tort actions or victim compensation statutes."). 
103. Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Carter v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) ("The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to 
read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 
otherwise innocent conduct.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 
("By use or combination of these various [levels of mens rea, courts] have sought to protect 
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law 
crimes."). 
104. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 ('The unanimity with which [courts] have adhered 
to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the 
variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element. 
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have de-
vised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms 
as 'felonious intent,' 'criminal intent,' 'malice aforethought,' 'guilty knowledge,' 'fraudulent 
intent,' 'wilfulness,' 'scienter,' to denote guilty knowledge, or 'mens rea,' to signify an evil 
purpose or mental culpability."). 
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A. Ascribing Moral Blameworthiness 
"The normal purpose of the criminal law is to condemn and punish 
conduct that society regards as immoral."105 But not all acts, equal in 
harm, are equally immoral. A driver, for example, who accidentally kills a 
pedestrian, through no fault of his own, is not as morally culpable as a 
driver who intentionally runs someone down.106 Similarly, there is a moral 
gap between a defendant involuntarily striking a person versus intentional-
ly hitting him,107 between taking property he thought to be abandoned 
versus absconding with his neighbor's,108 and even between unwittingly 
distributing child pornography versus doing so while knowing it to be 
such. 109 
Indeed, the more restrictive the mens rea, the more morally culpable 
the crime. The Model Penal Code's treatment of criminal homicide serves 
as a particularly good example of this principle. Although all involve the 
"death of another human being," the Model Penal Code divides criminal 
homicide into three separate crimes: murder, manslaughter, and negligent 
homicide. llo Murder is homicide committed "purposely," "knowingly," or 
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life."111 Manslaughter is homicide committed "recklessly" 
105. United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982); see also United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, 
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the communi-
ty, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
(2011) (asking federal judges to take into account, during sentencing, concerns substantially 
grounded in moral theory: the need "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense"). 
106. See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial 
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1075 (2011) ("[A] murder 
conviction expresses a greater degree of moral condemnation than a conviction for manslaugh-
ter."); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of 
Law," 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2316-17 (2003) ("Auto accidents and felony murders repre-
sent, specifically, a decision to assign different kinds of moral meaning to different kinds of 
violence and suffering."). 
107. See People v. Grant, 46 111. App. 3d 125, 129-130 (1977) (reversing jury conviction 
where defendant argued that the act was the result of a "psychomotor epileptic seizure"); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note (2001) ("[T]he fundamental predicate for all 
criminal liability, that the guilt of the defendant be based upon conduct, and that the conduct 
include a voluntary act."). 
108. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 276 (concluding that a defendant could not be convicted 
for taking shell casings from a federal bombing range, in violation of a statute prohibiting the 
theft of U.S. government property, where he innocently thought the shell casings to be aban-
doned). 
109. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1994) (conclud-
ing that because "the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence 
from wrongful conduct," the statute prohibiting trafficking in child pornography must be read 
to require a minimal scienter that the trafficked goods are child porn). 
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1. 
III. Id. § 210.2. 
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or "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse."112 And negligent homi-
cide is "[c]riminal homicide ... when it is committed negligently"113 (i.e., 
"when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk").114 Be-
cause the result is the same for all three crimes-the "death of 
another"115-the only difference is the degree of mens rea of the defend-
ant. This principle that mens rea defines the moral depravity of the crime 
is not uniquely attributable to the simplification and "uniformization" 
functions of the Model Penal Code, but has been traced to various histori-
cal sources, including American principles of individualism,116 theories of 
law and economics, 117 and nature. IIB 
Therefore, the mens rea attached to a crime measures the particular 
level of moral culpability wished to be ascribed to a guilty defendant. 119 
And to the extent that morality is a widely varied notion, there exist a me-
nagerie of colorful phrases defining differing levels of guilt. The Supreme 
Court commented on this variety in Morissette v. United States: 
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of 
the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the 
common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the 
central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal 
is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their def-
initions of the requisite but elusive mental element. However, 
courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different 
offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, 
for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious in-
tent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty 
knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to de-
note guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose 
or mental culpability.120 
112. Id. § 210.3. 
113. Id. § 210.4. 
114. Id. § 210.2. 
115. Id. § 210.1. 
116. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952) ("Crime, as a com-
pound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with 
an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root 
in American soil."). 
117. Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics o/Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 774-77 (1993). 
118. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 ("Even a dog distinguishes 
between being stumbled over and being kicked."). 
119. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643 (1991) ("If, then, two mental states are 
supposed to be equivalent means to satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense, they must 
reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability, whereas a difference 
in their perceived degrees of culpability would be a reason to conclude that they identified 
different offenses altogether."). 
120. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252. 
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A few specific examples reinforce the notion that the kaleidoscopic 
legal terminology surrounding mental states displays a complex, nuanced 
picture of moral culpability. Perhaps the most widely studied of these ex-
amples, the old common law murder standard of "the unlawful killing of 
another human being with malice aforethought,"121 arose as specifically 
tailored to implicate a particular degree of the defendant's moral culpabil-
ity: not "necessarily ... any special malevolence towards the individual 
slain, but ... of [the defendant's] depraved, wicked, and malicious spirit, a 
heart regardless of social duty, and a mind deliberately bent on mis-
chief."122 This standard of "malice" did not carryover into other common 
law conceptions of murder where the defendant, even though he was fac-
tually guilty of the killing, possessed a slightly lesser moral culpability. 123 
This kaleidoscopic view of criminal states has continued in more modem 
statutory crimes, such as the t934 Securities Exchange Act, which crimi-
nalizes the willful violation of its provisions. Willful in this context, 
however, has a particularly elusive-and hotly debated-meaning in de-
scribing securities fraud. 124 The appellate courts have alternatively 
described it as "knowingly and with intent to deceive"; 125 "intentionally 
undertaking an act that one knows to be wrongful ... not [necessarily] that 
the actor know specifically that the conduct was unlawful";126 and "volun-
tarily, intentionally, and with a specific intent to disregard, to disobey the 
law, with a bad purpose to violate the law."127 Thus, one of the purposes of 
criminal mental states is to sketch a specific, nuanced portrait of a particu-
lar level of moral opprobrium. 
B. Differentiating Between Torts and Crimes 
GeneralIy, "the paradigmatic task of the civil law is to compensate for 
damages caused in the normal conduct of everyday life, usually without 
regard to actual knowledge or intent."128 This is not to say that tort theory 
wholly dismisses any aspect of a defendant's mental state: intentional torts 
often focus on whether the defendant intended the consequences of his 
121. Schad, 501 U.S. at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.492, 495 (1896). 
123. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,226 (1977) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Schad, 501 U.S. at 644 (casting doubt on whether the mental state required for 
felony murder was the equivalent to "premeditation"). 
124. Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related 
Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1580-98 (2006) (discussing the state of, and the debate 
concerning, "willfulness" analysis in the securities context). 
125. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 570 (2d Cir. 2010). 
126. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004). 
127. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987); see 
also United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 18-19 (I st Cir. 1991) (applying the definition of 
"willfulness" in Bank of New England to securities crimes). 
128. Mann, supra note 102, at 1806 n.36. 
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act,129 while accidental torts center on whether the defendant's actions fell 
below some standard of objective reasonableness.13o But civil mental states 
are not the same as a criminal defendant's subjective state of belief or de-
sire as to the outcome of his conduct. 131 The principle purpose of tort law 
is the compensation of damages. 132 And to that end, one function of partic-
ularized concepts of mens rea is to distinguish the morally culpable, and 
hence criminally liable, from those who are merely financial responsi-
ble.I33 
There are numerous and diverse federal statutes that have "criminal 
kickers"134 to civil enforcement provisions, including the Securities Ex-
change Act,135 the Sherman Act, 136 the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"),137 and even the Poultry and Poultry Products 
Inspection Act ("PPIA").138 Each statute premises criminal liability not on 
any of the harms underlying the substantive offense but on the existence of 
a defendant's particular mens rea.139 
Both the Securities Exchange Act and the LMRDA make criminal the 
willful violations of their provisions. 14o In the securities fraud context, as 
discussed, the willful violation of securities laws is the only element sepa-
rating civil and criminal liability.141 Similarly, the Second Circuit, in Unit-
129. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998). 
130. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1255 (2001) ("An 
alternative to the view of negligence as a mental fact, though, was available in standard 
definitions given by common law judges. These treated negligence simply as conduct falling 
below the standard set by the reasonable man, without any reference to an inadvertent state of 
mind."). 
131. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 482-86 (1992) 
(positing that negligence and recklessness are standards of conduct rather than "states of be-
lief' or "states of desire"). 
132. See Mann, supra note 102, at 1806 n.36. 
133. See Karian, supra note 102, at 1117 ("[Clriminal law does not attempt to restore 
victims to the position they occupied before the commission of the crime; rather, it leaves such 
attempts to civil tort actions or victim compensation statutes."). 
134. Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar 
Criminal Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 591,600 (2006) (listing the following statutes). 
135. 15 U.S.c. § 78ff(a) (20 II). 
136. Id. § 1. 
137. 29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (2011). The act is popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. 
See Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2010). 
138. 21 U.S.c. § 461(a)(2011). 
139. Moohr, supra note 134, at 600 ("The only distinctions between civil and criminal 
liability in many statutes are the defendant's felonious intent, the mens rea element .... "). 
140. 15 U.S.c. § 78ff(a) (2011) ("Any person who willfully violates any provision of 
[the Securities Exchange Act] ... shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both .... "); 29 U.S.c. § 463(b) (2011) ("Any person 
who willfully violates [the LMRDA] section shall be fined not more than $\0,000 or impris-
oned for not more than one year, or both."). 
141. See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming the district 
court's reversal of defendant's conviction where the government failed to prove "willfulness"); 
Moohr, supra note 134, at 600 (discussing this in the context of the Martha Stewart case). 
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United States v. Ottley, reversed a defendant's conviction even where the 
evidence of the labor violation was sufficient because the evidence on 
willfulness left the court "with an uneasy feeling occasioned by a possibly 
confusing charge on the crucial question of criminal intent."142 This hold-
ing consequently separated the standard of criminal intent for a fiduciary 
duty from its parallel in a civil action. 143 
The Sherman Act, too, uses a mens rea element-knowingly-to sepa-
rate criminal and civil antitrust liability.l44 In United States v. A. Lanoy 
Alston, D.M.D., P.c., the Government criminally prosecuted, under the 
Sherman Act, a group of dentists who successfully petitioned their local 
health care companies to increase co-payment fees. 14S Though the jury 
convicted the defendants, the district court vacated the conviction, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 146 Finding that there was scant evidence at trial that 
the defendants knowingly violated the antitrust laws, the court stated: "If 
the dentists had believed they were only complying with the [companies'] 
requests, they would have lacked the mens rea necessary for a price-fixing 
conspiracy."147 This mental state, the court concluded, was the difference 
between "a dispute normally handled as a civil enforcement matter [and] 
the crushing consequences of a criminal conviction."148 
The PPIA establishes two tiers of criminal liability: "knowing" viola-
tions of its provisions, generally punishable by a fine and one year's 
imprisonment, and violations with the "intent to defraud," punishable by 
three years' imprisonment. 149 Otherwise, the PPIA is no more than a strict 
liability civil offense. ISO For this reason, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
it was a "crucial charge ... that [the defendant] knowingly stored [the un-
inspected] products under insanitary conditions," and affirmed the 
defendant's conviction where the prosecution put forth significant evi-
dence of the defendant's mental state. lSI 
142. United States v. Ottley, 509 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1975). 
143. Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1274 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing the impli-
cations of Ottley in separating the mental states required for criminal and civil liability). 
144. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 631-32 (1980) (discussing the require-
ment in U.S. Gypsum that criminal Sherman Act violations incorporate a "knowingly" mens 
rea); 16 U.S.c. § I 174(a) (2011) ("Any person who knowingly violates any provision of [the 
Fur Seals Act] or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder shall, upon conviction, be fined 
not more than $20,000 for such violation, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."). 
145. United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.c., 974 F.2d 1206, 1207 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
146. Id. at 1215. 
147. /d. at 1213. 
148. Id. at 1214. 
149. 21 U.S.C. § 461 (a)(20 I I). 
150. Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Ap-
proach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563,567 n.47 (2004). 
151. United States v. LaGrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 2006) (em-
phasis added); see also United States v. P&S Foods, Inc., No. S2-4:02 CR 529 (COP) (DON), 
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In another circumstance, Congress enacted two separate statutes for 
criminal and civil liability resulting from the same substantive offense. 
Both the Anti-Kickback Act and the Stark Act prohibit physicians from 
collecting referral fees if any part of their treatment is funded by a federal 
program. 152 These statutes generally punish overlapping conduct as "part 
of a complex statutory and regulatory scheme."153 The Stark Act, however, 
is entirely a civil offense, while the Anti-Kickback Act provides for both 
criminal and civil penalties. 154 The major, substantive component underly-
ing this difference in penalty structure is that, "[i]n contrast, [the] Stark 
[Act] is not a criminal statute and contains no scienter element."155 Apart 
from mens rea, courts have struggled to distinguish the conduct as being 
more properly pursued as an Anti-Kickback or Stark violation. 156 There-
fore, whether a defendant is criminally as opposed to civilly liable will 
solely tum on whether the defendant did so with "intent to induce referrals 
or that plaintiff solicited the remuneration in exchange for referrals."157 
These examples all suggest that "[t]he mental state of the accused matters 
because criminal liability, unlike tort liability, envisages punishment of the 
perpetrator rather than compensation of the victim."158 
C. Shielding the Innocent 
Another "purpose of the mens rea requirement [is] to shield people 
against punishment for apparently innocent activity."159 That is, it estab-
lishes a minimal predicate below which a defendant will not be punished 
for conduct that is otherwise not wrongful. This rationale for mens rea 
generally does not apply to crimes that are malum in se-where the physi-
cal act is wrongful in itself-because any mens rea merely specifies the 
particular level or aspect of wrongfulness society seeks to punish.l60 
2003 WL 25735595, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2003) (finding that the indictment sufficiently 
described the defendant's "intent to defraud"). 
152. 42 U.S.c. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)(A) (2011) (setting forth the Anti-Kickback Act which 
prohibits a physician from "referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging 
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part 
under a Federal health care program"); [d. § 1395nn(a)(l)(A) (prohibiting a physician from 
"mak[ing] a referral ... for the furnishing of designated health services for which payment 
otherwise may be made under [the Stark Act]"). 
153. Feldstein v. Nash Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (E.D.N.C. 
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
154. Jd. at 687. 
155. /d. 
156. See id. (stating that although the two statutes appeared to punish the same conduct, 
"(t]he fact remains, however, that both statutes exist, and both should be given meaning if 
possible"). 
157. Jd. at 684. 
158. Ross, supra note 102, at 978. 
159. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,622 (\994) (Ginsburg, 1., concurring). 
160. See supra Part II.A. 
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Where the innocent, physical act is mala prohibita, however, a mens rea 
threshold "avoids criminalizing apparently innocent conduct."161 
In Staples v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
defendant charged with possession of an unregistered machine gun could 
challenge his indictment by claiming that he was ignorant of the gun's na-
ture. 162 The operative statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d),163 punished possessing 
an unregistered, automatic weapon with ten years' imprisonment,l64 but was 
silent on the issue of intent. 165 At trial, the defendant did not contest that the 
weapon was not registered, but asserted that he was ignorant that it could 
be tired automatically.166 The Court agreed with the defendant, and re-
versed his conviction. 167 Concluding that the "long tradition of widespread 
lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country"168 made gun 
ownership an otherwise lawful activity, the Court reasoned that even a con-
gressional statute silent on mens rea must not have meant to dispose of one 
entirely.169 It consequently added a mens rea element of knowingly to the 
type of gun ownership. This minimal level of mens rea freed "law-abiding, 
well-intentioned citizens [from] a possible ten-year term of imprison-
ment."170 
The Court did much the same in Liparota v. United States concerning 
the use of food stamps. 171 There, the Court concluded that the statute's 
prohibition on the use of food stamps "in any manner not authorized by 
[law]"172 must also include an element of the defendant's knowledge. 173 
Because purchasing and possessing food stamps was an otherwise inno-
cent activity, a strict liability regime for their misuse would "criminalize a 
broad range of apparently innocent conduct," including "us[ing] stamps to 
161. Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
162. [d. at 602 (majority opinion). 
163. 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d) (2011). 
164. Staples, 511 U.S.at616. 
165. /d. at 605. 
166. [d. at 603. 
167. [d. at 620. 
168. [d. at 610. 
169. [d. at 615-16. The Supreme Court also disposed of two arguments asserted by the 
United States. First, that because their purpose is to regulate inherently dangerous devices, 
federal gun regulations should be deemed to have purposely left out any element of mens rea 
in an effort to bring such statutes within the ambit of strict liability "public welfare offenses." 
[d. at 606-07; see supra note 100. Second, the defendant should have been generally aware of 
gun registration requirements. Staples, 511 U.S. at 608-09. The Court dismissed the former 
given the long tradition of American ownership of guns, unlike other articles more typically in 
the category of public welfare commodities, such as hand grenades or narcotics. /d. at 612. 
The Court dismissed the latter by giving examples of the relative ease of gun ownership in 
many states as disproving the notion that gun-owners, as a collective lot, should be well-
versed in federal gun regulations. /d. at 614 n.9. 
170. [d. at 615 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989». 
171. Liparotav. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
172. [d. at 427. 
173. [d. at 425-26. 
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purchase food from a store that, unknown to him, charged higher than 
normal prices to food-stamp-program participants."174 A contrary holding 
would have done nothing to "strike[] the appropriate balance between the 
legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminalliability."175 
The Second Circuit followed course in United States v. Bronx Rep-
tiles, Inc. 176 concerning the Lacey Act, which prohibits "any person [from] 
... knowingly ... caus[ing] or permit[ing] any wild animal or bird to be 
transported to the United States, or any Territory or district thereof, under 
inhumane or unhealthful conditions."177 The court concluded that the 
knowledge element of the statute required a defendant charged under the 
Lacey Act to be aware of the "inhumane or unhealthful conditions" of the 
transported wild animal because" '[i]n many, if not most, circumstances, 
it is perfectly innocent' for a person knowingly to cause or permit the 
transportation of a wild animal or bird to the United States."178 This view 
of mens rea as a floor to the criminal regulation of conduct at least "en-
sure[s] that persons subject to conviction ... will have committed a 
minimally blameworthy act."179 
III. THE PURPOSE OF INTENT IN PATENT LAW 
A patent is little more than a legal right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, selling, or offering to sell one's invention. '80 It is, in essence, a 
monopoly over a particular invention. '81 The Constitution urges Congress 
to provide inventors such monopolies "to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,"182 and, more specifically, enables Congress to encourage 
invention by allowing inventors the opportunity to recoup their research 
174. Id. at 426. 
175. Id. at 427. 
176. United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2(00). 
177. 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (2011). 
178. Bronx Reptiles, 217 F.3d at 88 (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d III, 
I 16 (2d Cir. 1998» (internal citations omitted). 
179. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 131-32 
(2009). 
180. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) ("[T]he Patent 
Act also declares that 'patents shall have the attributes of personal property,' [35 U.S.C.] 
§ 261, including 'the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention,' [35 U.S.c.] § I 54(a)(I )."). 
181. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964) ("The grant of a 
patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly ... not given as favors, as was the case of monopo-
lies given by the Tudor monarchs, ... but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the 
inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from 
the use of his invention."). 
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8. 
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and development costS.183 The exchange for such an expansive right is the 
public disclosure of the invention. 184 
When another violates an inventor's monopoly, the inventor's sole legal 
recourse is a federal patent infringement action under 35 U.S.c. § 271. 185 
No state-law causes of action exist because patent law is exclusively a fed-
eral domain.186 Nor are there any separate common law causes of action 
because the federal infringement statute, § 271, has swallowed common law 
theories of infringement by codification. 187 And although a patent has many 
attributes of a federal property grant,188 there is no administrative procedure 
for violations by a private party. 189 
Generally, there are three types of patent infringement: direct 
infringement under § 271 (a), induced infringement under § 271 (b) (as in 
Global-Tech), and contributory infringement under § 271(c). Direct 
infringement, as a strict liability offense, does not have a mental state 
requirement. 190 Induced infringement, prior to Global-Tech, required mere 
constructive knowledge-less akin to a criminal mental state than an objective 
standard. 191 And contributory infringement's mental state requirement is 
183. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."); John 
M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEx. L. REV. 505, 517 (2010) ("Under a stand-
ard economic understanding, the basic purpose of a patent is to enable a rights holder to price 
above marginal cost so that the rights holder has a greater opportunity to recoup costs of de-
veloping or disseminating the invention."). 
184. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,224 (2003) ("Complete disclosure as a precondi-
tion to the issuance of a patent is part of the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly 
for the inventor as consideration for full and immediate access by the public when the limited 
time expires."). 
Because public disclosure further promotes scientific progress by aiding additional in-
vention in the field, the patent system-on the whole-appears to fulfill its constitutional 
mandate in two ways. 
185. Section 271 defines infringement while § 281 creates a cause of action. See 35 
U.S.C. § 281 (2011) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his 
patent."). 
186. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (holding 
that federal law preempts state law causes of action for patent infringement). 
187. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
("Section 271(a) was merely a codification of the common law of infringement that had de-
veloped up to the time of passage of the 1952 Patent Act. It was not meant to change the law 
of infringement." (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 n.1O 
( 1972))). 
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2011) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal proper-
ty"). 
189. Cf Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 269, 286-97 (2004) (discussing disputes between private parties over electromagnetic 
spectrum licenses); S. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better Receptionfrom the 
FCC's Spectrum Policy, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2004) (discussing the FCC's adminis-
trative procedures to resolve licensing disputes). 
190. See infra Part III.A. 
191. See supra Part I. 
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limited to the accused infringer knowing that a component is especially 
made to operate in an infringing manner. l92 None, however, are concerned 
with the purposes of criminal mental state requirements: ascribing moral 
culpability, differentiating torts from crimes, or shielding the innocent. 
Rather, the presence and absence of mental state elements in infringement 
actions serve to facilitate patent holders in obtaining damages for 
infringement of their patents. The sections below discuss each type of 
infringement and the presence or absence of a mental state requirement. 
A. Direct Infringement 
Section 271(a) lists the acts constituting direct infringement: "whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented in-
vention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."193 Direct 
infringement is notable for its lack of a mental state requirement: it is a strict 
liability offense. 194 As such, direct infringement does not focus on any sense 
of morality or retribution or rehabilitation, but solely on the civil economic 
redress of the patent holder. The remedies for direct infringement demon-
strate this focus, whether they are for retrospective or prospective relief. 195 
For claims of past infringement, a patent holder is limited to monetary re-
lief.196 For claims seeking to prevent future infringement, a patent holder 
may demand either injunctive or monetary relief. 197 In either event, the pur-
pose of the patent infringement action is to either compensate the owner of a 
patent for the unauthorized use of an infringer,198 or to delay the entry of a 
competitor in the market place.199 It largely-if not entirely--crafts econom-
ic remedies in response to economic harms. 
This stands in contrast to other causes of action for property violations. 
Traditionally, the ownership of real property had a moral component.2oo 
192. See infra Part III.C. 
193. 35 U.S.c. § 27 1 (a) (2011). 
194. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("8e-
cause patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant 
in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted."). 
195. See e8ay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.c., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (discussing the 
case where patent holder sued for damages for past infringement and an injunction to prevent 
future infringement). 
196. See 35 U.S.c. § 284 (2011) (authorizing damages of "in no event less than a rea-
sonable royalty"); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
197. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
198. See Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
199. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innova-
tion Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1273 (2009). 
200. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (discussing the intersection between morality and proper-
ty). 
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From a constitutional perspective, "the overriding respect for the sanctity of 
the home ... has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Re-
public."20I Fourteenth Amendment due process protects property alongside 
such weighty ideals as "life" and ''liberty.''202 This moral focus on property 
ownership makes common law trespass actions actionable even if no econom-
ic harm was felt by the owner.203 This remains true today even in a world 
where calls for a "cost-justification" approach to trespass have become in-
creasingly vehement.204 In a famous case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
awarded a trespass victim $1 in nominal damages but $100,000 in punitive 
damages.2os One commentator has described the opinion as "one of quiet 
outrage."206 
Nuisance-another common law cause of action for property viola-
tions-has similarly incorporated aspects of morality, as well as 
utilitarianism.207 The Second Restatement of Torts, for example, defines an 
"unreasonable" nuisance as an activity where "the gravity of the harm out-
weighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or ... the harm caused by the 
conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for [it] ... 
would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible."208 The Su-
preme Court adopted this mixed approach in a takings case to determine 
whether the plaintiff's proposed use of his land to build homes constituted a 
nuisance, as asserted by the State of South Carolina.209 Rather than deferring 
to South Carolina's assertion, the Court required an inquiry into "the degree 
of harm to public lands and resources, ... the social value of the claimant's 
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease 
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the 
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike."2Io 
Countless pieces of legal scholarship have prescribed such a flexible ap-
proach.211 
201. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 601 (1980). 
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
203. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, 
and National Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1406 (2010). 
204. See Ben Deporter, Fair Trespass, III COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1090--95 (2011) (call-
ing trepass "a seemingly tranquil and uncomplicated backwater of property law," and 
discussing the ossification of strict liability trespass doctrine). 
205. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997). At the time of writing, 
the case has already been cited by ninety-two law review articles. 
206. See Merril & Smith, supra note 200, at 1872. 
207. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
strains, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 77-79 (1979). 
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1965). 
209. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992). 
210. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
211. E.g., Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to 
Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 994-95 (2010) (proposing nuisance 
theory in response to "chemical manufacturers' failure to test their products ... [for] its sim-
plicity and relatively flexible application"); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE 
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But direct infringement actions are not flexible. They neither weigh the 
gravity of harms, nor measure the financial burden of compensation, nor 
balance these concerns with the "wrongness" of the defendant's conduct. 
Direct infringement actions are therefore strict liability offenses divorced 
from both morality and public utility.212 Perhaps the best example of direct 
infringement's rejection of utilitarianism is the set of E-911 cases filed by 
patent-holding company EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Technology, 
LLC.213 In these cases, EMSAT sued a number of cellular service providers, 
such as AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile,214 for infringing a patent that claimed a 
"cellular communication system," which "forward[ed an] exact geographic 
location and specific mobile unit identification for use in subsequent ser-
vices."215 EMSAT claimed that the providers infringed its patent when they 
forwarded the geographic location of its users to local law enforcement au-
thorities during 911 calls-that is, that the cell phone companies infringed 
its patent by allowing their users to call 911 in an emergency.216 It seems fair 
to say that the equities favor the cell phone companies: the ability of a cell 
phone user to call for help in a life-or-death emergency should morally 
trump an intellectual property right. It seems probable that whatever public 
utility is gained by certainty in clearly demarcated property rights is offset 
by the disutility of the lack of mobile phone access to first responders. But 
these concerns simply do not figure in these cases because there is no ave-
nue for them to be litigated. 
Furthermore, direct infringement actions are not subject to the tradition-
al sort of equitable property defenses. There is no "good faith" exception to 
patent infringement. An accused infringer who manifested a "good faith 
belief' that he had proper license to the asserted patent cannot escape liabil-
W. RES. L. REV. 753, 783 (200S) (suggesting the creation of common law causes of action for 
environmental nuisances as "flexible, innovative, and responsive"); Steven Kam, Note, Intel 
Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine ofCyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 427, 42S (2004) (suggesting the creation of a nuisance "cyber-tort" akin to the trespass of 
chattels). 
212. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 136S (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) ("Be-
cause patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant 
in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted."). 
213. E.g., EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Tech., LLC V. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. OS-
cv-S22 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2ooS); EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Tech., LLC v. Sprint 
Spectrum, LP, No. OS-cv-SIS (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2OOS); EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location 
Tech., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. OS-cv-SI7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2OOS). 
In the interest of disclosure, I represented T-Mobile in its case against EMSAT. 
214. See supra note 213. 
215. U.S. Patent No. 7,2S9,763, col. 171. 43-56 (filed Nov. 22,2004). 
216. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 'lI'lI II-IS, EMSAT 
Advanced Geo-Location Technology, LLC V. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 WL S43205 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. S, 201 I) (No. OS-cv-S 17). 
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ity.217 Patent law also does not contain a "fair use" doctrine.218 "[W]hoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention" 
is liable for patent infringement,219 regardless as to the quantity or quality of 
the infringing activity.220 Even the common law "research exemption," 
which inoculated a defendant from infringement liability if the defendant's 
activities were "solely for research, academic or experimental purposes,"221 
has mostly been eliminated after Madey v. Duke University.222 Now, a de-
fendant facing a claim of patent infringement must prove that its allegedly 
infringing activity was "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict-
ly philosophical inquiry" that does not have "definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes."223 The Federal Circuit has not upheld a 
finding of noninfringement based on the research exemption since Madey. 
Contrasted with other forms of civil redress, the Federal Circuit's focus in 
Madey is purely economic-just as in direct infringement actions. 
B. Induced Infringement 
Subsection (b) of the infringement statute makes liable "[w]hoever ac-
tively induce[d] infringement of a patent,"224 that is, those who "aided and 
abetted another's direct infringement of the patent."225 This language, "aid 
and abet," and the Supreme Court's decision in Global-Tech, may appear to 
suggest that the purpose of the "actively induce" language is the same as 
that for criminal accessory. But actions for infringement-by-inducement do 
not seek to stamp a moral imprimatur on the underlying activity; the Federal 
Circuit has rejected the notion that inducement places any moral weight on 
the allegations of direct infringement. In Rodime PLC v. Seagate Technolo-
gies, Inc., the court compared the plaintiff's infringement-by-inducement 
claims to its unfair competition claims, and noted that "[i]nducement re-
quires no proof that the acts underlying the inducement are 'wrongful' by 
some measure other than the fact of the inducement itself.,,226 This contrasts 
217. Filtroil, N.A. v. Maupin, 20 F. App'x 834, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Note, however, that 
such a good faith belief may prevent the plaintiff from collecting enhanced damages under 35 
U.S.c. § 285. See id. 
218. See Soitec, S.A. v. Silicon Genesis Corp., 81 F. App'x 734,737 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
("There is no fair use or research and development exception for infringement of normal 
commercial processes."). See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use 
in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (discussing the lack of a fair use doctrine in 
patent law). 
219. 35 U.S.c. § 271 (a) (2011). 
220. See O'Rourke, supra note 218, at 1205 n.118 (discussing this contrast between 
patent and copyright law). 
221. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
222. /d. at 1361-63. 
223. /d. at 1361-62. 
224. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2011). 
225. See Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
226. /d. 
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greatly with "aiding and abetting" or "accessory" liability in the criminal 
context where the underlying activity must be made "wrongful," either by 
statute or by traditional common law principles.227 
The difference between infringement-by-inducement and criminal ac-
cessory liability is further contrasted by their differing scopes of liability. 
Under federal law, the principal need not be convicted of any crime for an 
accessory to be criminally liable.228 Even where the principal has been af-
firmatively acquitted, an accessory can be found guilty of aiding and 
abetting a "crime" committed by a legally innocent defendant.229 Not so for 
inducement claims, where "[ilt is well settled that there can be no induce-
ment of infringement without direct infringement by some party."230 In 
ACCD Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturers Co., the Federal Circuit 
overturned a jury verdict of induced infringement because the patent holder 
did not prove "specific instances of direct infringement or show that the ac-
cused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit."23I Inducement, 
therefore, is not a moral device but a tool concerned with providing eco-
nomic recovery against "upstream" infringers. 
Indeed, without inducement, the patent holder "is left with the poten-
tially enormous burden of proceeding against the numerous direct 
infringers who purchased the copied product."232 This becomes especially 
important in cases where the direct infringers themselves are either too 
numerous233 or too "shallow-pocketed"234 to be sued-most notably in the 
corporation-inducer/consumer-infringer context.235 This was precisely the 
227. See Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminaiizing Remote Harms, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 370, 371-75 (2007) (discussing "critical morality" in the context of accomplice 
liability). 
228. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15-18 (1980). 
229. [d. 
230. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., I F. App'x 879, 
882 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
231. ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
232. Mixing Equip. Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., No. 85-535, 1986 WL 14541, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 19, 1986). 
233. See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(affirming district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against the generiC-drug manufac-
turer defendant for infringement-by-inducement, where defendant's label "would lead many 
users to directly infringe the asserted method claims" of the patent-at-issue). 
234. See, e.g., Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Broadway Ltd. Imps., No. JKB-09-2657, 2011 
WL 856306, at *2-3 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2011) (concluding that patent-holder's complaint was 
sufficient where it sought recovery against the inducer because the direct infringer "has few 
employees and few, if any, assets"). 
235. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718, 
at *9 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (affirming district court's judgment of infringement-by-
inducement where corporate defendant induced 8-29% of its customers to directly infringe the 
asserted patent); AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1049; Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301,1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
Fall 2012] Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct 27 
Federal Circuit's concern in Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc.236 There, 
the plaintiff accused the defendant of contributory infringement and induc-
ing the defendant's customers to infringe its CD-burning technology.237 
Refusing to dismiss the inducement claims, the court noted that it would not 
leave the plaintiff with "the only remedy [of suing] end users of the product 
for direct infringement."238 Similar to claims for civil copyright infringe-
ment, the court recognized that "it may be impossible to enforce rights in 
the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, [making t]he only 
practical alternative [going] against the distributor of the copying device for 
secondary liability."239 Thus, the purpose of the "actively induce" mental 
state in infringement-by-inducement is to afford patent holders broader ave-
nues for economic recovery than would be available through direct 
infringement alone. Its focus, like direct infringement, is on economic re-
dress, not moral condemnation or shielding "innocent" upstream infringers. 
C. Contributory Infringement 
Subsection (c) of the infringement statute, the "contributory infringe-
ment" provision, makes liable whoever "imports into the United States a 
component of a [patent] ... constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in 
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use."240 Unlike infringe-
ment-by-inducement, contributory infringement requires a mental state: 
"knowing [the sold component] to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent."241 The Supreme Court in 
Aro II long ago held that the contributory infringement's inclusion of the 
word "knowing" required the defendant to know both that the sold compo-
nent was part of a patented article and that the end-product would infringe 
that patent when combined.242 
While the typical purpose of the "knowledge element in criminal law 
is to shield innocent defendants from "the crushing consequences of a 
criminal conviction,"243 there are no such concerns behind the contributory 
infringement statute. As stated by former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, 
236. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam). 
237. {d. at 1336. 
238. {d. at 1338. 
239. {d. (quoting Melro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
929-30 (2006». 
240. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (201 I). 
241. {d. 
242. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro 11), 377 U.S. 476, 488 
(\964). 
243. United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., pc., 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 
1992); see also supra Part II.C. 
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Giles S. Rich, "[t]hat aspect of patent law referred to as contributory in-
fringement is particularly concerned with economics."244 In Glenayre 
Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson, the Federal Circuit discussed this aspect of 
contributory infringement, including the rule that damages assessed to a con-
tributory infringer are normally "the same as damages that would be assessed 
had the patentee sued and obtained a judgment against the customers."245 
Where the plaintiff had already recovered damages in full for the harm he 
suffered from the direct infringement of his patent, the Glenayre court prohib-
ited him from collecting additional damages for the arising acts of 
contributory infringernent.246 This evidences the Federal Circuit's concern 
with making plaintiffs economically "whole" rather than separating the guilty 
from the innocent.247 Further, it seems particularly peculiar to import a crimi-
nal knowledge requirement with such a concern where the direct infringement 
provisions of the patent statute, so equated with contributory infringement, 
unhesitatingly impose strict liability for otherwise innocent offenses.248 
Professor Bartholomew has similarly written about how contributory in-
fringement's "explicitly nonretributive [sic] justification clashes with the moral 
basis for criminal punishment of aiders and abettors of crimes."249 "Intellectual 
property law differs from general tort law," he writes, "in that it is particularly 
concerned with the aggregate effects of a defendant's behavior rather than pre-
cisely identifying who is blameworthy for a particular wrongful act."250 The 
character of knowledge required to prove contributory infringement should not 
evidence a concern with separating the morally guilty from the financially re-
sponsible. Rather, it should allow recovery to those who have any form of 
knowledge of their contributorily infringing activities. This better comports 
with the economic concerns of contributory infringement voiced by former 
Chief Judge Rich and the court in Glenayre. Although Professor Bartholomew 
suggests that the purpose of contributory infringement actions are utilitarian 
rather than economic251-a point generally contested by this article-he too 
244. Giles S. Rich, Contributory lrifringement, 14 FED. OR. 8.1. 99, 100 (2004-2005). 
245. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 444 F.3d 851, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
246. Id. at 860. 
247. See id. at 859 ("A patentee who suffers lost profits or loss of royalty income ordi-
narily can be compensated and made whole by the manufacturing infringer. In the usual 
course of events, the length of the accused manufacturer's distribution chain should have no 
impact on the patentee's ability to be made whole by the manufacturer." (quoting Jerry R. 
Selinger & Jessica W. Young, Suing an Infringing Competitor's Customers: Or, Life Under the 
Single Recovery Rule, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 52 (1997))(intemal alterations omitted)). 
248. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1 (a) (2011). 
249. Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Sean:h Engines: The Questionable Role of 
Criminal Law in Contributory lrifringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REv. 783, 785. 
250. Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
675,737 (2011). 
251. Id. at 736-37. 
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has argued for "another organizing principle for contributory infringement, 
outside of criminal law."252 It should be so. 
D. Willful Infringement 
Although no section of the patent statute provides for increased penal-
ties if the infringer's conduct is found to be willful, "a trial court's 
discretion in awarding enhanced damages has a long lineage in patent 
law."253 This stems from courts' "statutory discretion to enhance damages 
for patent infringement [that has been available] since 1836."254 Until re-
cently, enhanced damages in the patent context have traditionally centered 
on whether the defendant acted in "bad faith."255 There, bad faith har-
nessed the moral culpability of the actor.256 The standard was punitive257 
and made material the mental state of the offender.258 
The Federal Circuit, however, jettisoned this decidedly moralistic ap-
proach in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.259 Explicitly overruling its prior 
decision in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen CO.,260 Seagate 
concluded "that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damag-
es requires at least a showing of objective recklessness '" [and] 
abandon[ed] the affirmative duty of due care,"261 previously required in 
Underwater Devices. After Seagate, "to establish willful infringement, a 
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer 
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement of a valid patent."262 
Importantly, Seagate tacked away from the traditional, moralistic 
proof previously required to prove willful infringement. The Federal Cir-
cuit ablated any language concerning "bad faith,"263 "culpability,"264 
252. Bartholomew, supra note 249, at 786. 
253. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2(07) (en banc). 
254. Id. at 1368 n.3; see also 35 U.S.c. § 284 (2011). 
255. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the ori-
gins of "bad faith infringement"). 
256. See id. 
257. Id. at 1570. 
258. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) ("Intent becomes a requirement only if and when the patent owner seeks en-
hanced damages or attorney fees for willful infringement."). 
259. Seagate, 498 F.3d at 1370-72. 
260. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 
overruled by Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360. 
261. Seagate,497 F.3d at 1371. 
262. Id. 
263. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But see Bard Pe-
ripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., 670 F.3d 1l71, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the factors for determining the amount of damages in a willfulness finding in the 
context of assessing "bad faith"). 
264. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Under our cases, enhanced damages may be awarded only as a penal-
ty for an infringer's increased culpability, namely willful infringement or bad faith."). 
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"motive,"265 or "evil intent" from determinations of willful infringe-
ment.266 Rather, as Seagate acknowledges, "[t]he state of mind of the 
accused infringer is not relevant to [the] objective inquiry" required to 
prove willfulness. 267 Even with respect to whether the defendant was cog-
nizant of its own actions, Seagate does not necessitate actual knowledge 
but only asks whether the risk was "known or so obvious that it should 
have been known to the accused infringer."268 
Removing the subjective inquiry into a defendant's mental state to 
prove willfulness also removes much of the moral culpability associated 
with it. In the words of Professor Jason A. Rantanen, Seagate "is, in fact, a 
shift downwards from a subjective view of fault toward an objective view, 
and thus implicates a lower threshold of fault than previously existed."269 
Seagate condones imposing enhanced damages on the naIve: those who 
should have known their actions carried an objectively high likelihood of 
infringement but did not actually know so. The morally blameless might 
nevertheless fall within Seagate's catch. A garage-shop tinkerer who at-
tempts to recreate a known invention without knowing it to be patented, an 
industrial chemist who attempts to work around a patent but fails, and a re-
search scientist who mistakenly believes his use of the patented invention 
falls within the research exemption might all be liable under Seagate. None 
of these actors can be said to possess the evil intent previously inherent in 
the law of willful infringement. 
This is not to say that willful infringement may not serve a dual pur-
pose: it may also function to punish and deter the truly "bad actors" in the 
world of patent infringement. Skeletons of the Federal Circuit's prior moral-
istic approach remain. While Seagate addressed whether an infringer had 
violated a patent willfully, the Federal Circuit has continued to rely on some 
older, more subjective factors in determining how much a willful infringer is 
liable for its act. 270 But even here, these weigh towards an objective stand-
ard. While they include such subjective inquiries as "whether the infringer 
deliberately copied the ideas or design of another," and whether the infringer 
"formed a good faith belief that [the patent] was invalid or that it was not 
265. Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) ("[The infringer's I motives and knowledge may affect the question of damages, to swell 
or reduce them .... ") (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) 
(No. 10,740)). 
266. Id. 
267. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
268. Id. 
269. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1575, 1608-09 (2011). 
270. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 201 I) ("Seagate 
removed the presumption of willful infringement flowing from an infringer's failure to exer-
cise due care to avoid infringement, but Seagate did not change the application of the Read 
factors with respect to enhancement of damages when willful infringement under § 285 is 
found."); see also Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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infringed,"271 they also include more objective ones, such as "the infringer's 
size and financial condition," "the duration of the misconduct," and "the 
remedial action by the infringer.'>272 The subjective, moral inquiry into the 
infringer's "state of mind" is thus slight: it is only unearthed after there has 
been an objective determination that the infringer acted willfully, and only 
in connection with other objective inquiries in assessing exceptional damag-
es.273 
Nonetheless, willful infringement is not based on a purely moral ac-
count. Those who are indifferent to potentially infringing a patent may do so 
at an Objective risk short of "high," like the garage shop tinkerer mentioned 
above. A purely moral account of willful infringement that seeks solely to 
punish the wrongdoing of infringement fails to account for willful infringe-
ment that does not also possess an evil intent. The existence of remedies for 
willful infringement, whatever its purposes, should not be read as imparting 
morality to patent infringement. 
IV. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
The differences between the purposes of mental states in criminal and 
patent law suggest that they should be treated differently. But Global-Tech 
contlates them, requiring courts to adopt a criminal concept of willful blind-
ness into the inducement provision of the infringement statute. This 
importation of a criminal mental state into the inducement provision-and 
the hastiness with which the Supreme Court did so-creates several prob-
lems. One-importing criminal mental states into the infringement statute 
makes it more difficult for patent holders to prove infringement, even when 
they have been economically harmed. Two-criminal mental states unrealis-
tically describe a typical infringer's "intent" in patent infringement cases. 
And three-the easiness with which the Supreme Court adopted a criminal 
mental state in a patent case, wholesale, continues a general and unwise 
trend of importing foreign elements into civil law causes of action. Rather 
than taking the Supreme Court's approach in Global-Tech, lower courts ex-
amining other areas of civil law should carefully assess the purposes of any 
mental state requirements before interpreting them. 
A. Importing Criminal Concepts of Mens Rea into the Patent Statute 
Disallows Economic Recovery for Legitimately Harmed Plaintiffs 
The Court's importation of a criminal concept of willful blindness into 
the infringement statute in Global-Tech does nothing to further the econom-
ic goals of inducement liability. Rather, it absolves classes of infringers 
271 . Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 1349. 
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from liability. The point of the willful blindness standard, adopted by the 
Court, is to impute actual knowledge of a crime to a defendant to "prevent a 
criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by deliberately closing 
his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct."274 In 
this sense it writes a moral gloss onto the normative implication that 
"wrong-doers" cannot absolve themselves of criminal responsibility simply 
by shutting their eyes to events surrounding them. At the same time, willful 
blindness "surpasses recklessness and negligence"275-both of which allow 
those who are merely risky, stupid, or error-prone to avoid criminal liability 
for the same acts. Willful blindness only makes liable "one who takes delib-
erate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who 
can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts."276 
Willful blindness does not comport with the cost-benefit approach to 
inducement taken by the Federal Circuit in Ricoh.277 There, the Federal Cir-
cuit endorsed the proposition that without inducement liability, or with only 
a weak regime of inducement liability, many patent holders would be left 
without a reasonable avenue for recovery when their patents are actually 
infringed.278 
Additionally, the Supreme Court's importation of willful blindness 
serves neither the goals of moral retribution nor economic redress. A moral-
istic infringement-by-inducement regime should not be concerned with 
plaintiffs' difficulties in suing numerous defendants--one of the issues ad-
dressed in Ricoh. Rather, because a moralistic regime would require a patent 
holder to prove that an infringer acted with a greater level of knowledge 
than required in an amoral regime, willful blindness disallows legitimately 
harmed patent plaintiffs a reasonable recovery mechanism from numerous 
actual infringers. 
Although GLobaL-Tech is still recent, its practical effects can already be 
seen. In Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, the plaintiff sued the defendant 
for inducing infringement of the plaintiff's patent directed to a golf swing 
trainer.279 The plaintiff, an individual inventor, accused the defendant of of-
fering to sell its patented invention after one the defendant's employees saw 
it demonstrated at a trade show.280 The plaintiff did not allege, however, that 
the defendant actually knew that its activities would cause direct infringe-
274. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2071 n.9 (2011) (quot-
ing United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380-381 (6th Cir. 1984» (internal alterations 
omitted). 
275. Id. at 2070. 
276. Id. at 2070-71. 
277. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam). 
278. Id. at 1338. 
279. Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-IO-CV-702-XR, 2011 WL 3359554, at 
*1 (W.O. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011). 
280. Id. at *5. 
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ment of the plaintiff's patent. After Global-Tech, the district court dismissed 
the inducement claim against the defendant for this supposed deficiency.281 
Global-Tech notwithstanding, this seems unwise. The plaintiff was al-
most certainly harmed by the defendant's marketing efforts. Further, the 
defendant appeared to have taken "a substantial and unjustified risk"282 in 
marketing its product because its business partner developed the accused 
product after watching a demonstration of the plaintiff's invention at a golf 
trade show. Whether this individual did so with actual knowledge of the 
plaintiff's patent, willfully blinded himself to potential infringement, or act-
ed with an "evil-meaning mind"283 should be irrelevant. Lastly, though some 
of the deficiencies in the plaintiff's case could have been rectified by more 
descriptive pleading,284 it is still clear that, after Global-Tech, the plaintiff 
would not be able to recover if the most he could prove was that the defend-
ant acted recklessly. A California district court disposed a similar claim on 
almost identical grounds.285 
Global-Tech also suggests that plaintiffs who bring their claims under 
other parts of the infringement statute are equally vulnerable to similar poor 
results. Claims for contributory infringement may similarly allow all but the 
most morally culpable defendants free rein to infringe, even where plaintiffs 
are otherwise legitimately harmed. A contributory infringement regime that 
requires facts of actual knowledge or willful blindness above mere construc-
tive knowledge disallows patent holders from recovering against those who 
took "a substantial and unjustified risk"286 that the end-product sold would 
infringe when combined.287 This would be acceptable if the contributory 
infringement statute sought to effectuate those goals of criminal law mental 
states (e.g., moral condemnation of those who possessed a mental state 
above "a substantial and unjustified risk" of infringement). But contributory 
infringement is not concerned with such nuances. Rather, a contributory 
infringement regime that imports a criminal concept of willfulness into its 
provisions would allow sellers of components of patented products to sell 
their components to wholesalers without knowing their intended purpose. A 
willful blindness regime, here, would also allow component sellers to blind 
themselves to their consumers' knowledge of how to use their product in an 
infringing manner. Patent holders should be allowed to recover against such 
sellers even though they are less morally culpable than those with actual 
knowledge. 
281. [d. 
282. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071. 
283. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
284. Aguirre, 2011 WL 3359554, at *5. 
285. Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. IO-CV-4686, 2011 WL 2837401, at 
*2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 14,2011). 
286. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071. 
287. See 35 U.S.c. § 271(c)(2011). 
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Similarly, patent holders should not be prevented from seeking relief 
from those who offer to sell their invention, even if they do not manifest a 
criminal concept of intent to be bound by their own offer. Importing crimi-
nal concepts of mens rea into the patent statute here would allow 
competitors to flood the market with bogus offers of the patented article that 
they never actually intend to fulfill. Competitors may want to choose to 
flood the market for several reasons including: (1) to test the waters for the 
article's true price, (2) to artificially lower or raise the price of the invention 
in a consumers' mind, or (3) to shut a patent holder out of the market entire-
ly.288 
This is not as far-fetched as it may seem. In Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden 
Source Electronics Ltd., the plaintiff accused the defendant of offering its 
patented invention for sale in the United States, only to have the sale con-
summated in Hong Kong as a backdoor way to gain a foothold in the 
American marketplace.289 The defendant raised one argument: that it be-
lieved that it did not infringe because it never intended to sell the patented 
product in any event.290 Though the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's 
claims on extraterritoriality grounds,291 it stated that it was "tempted to con-
clude that [the defendant] never made an 'offer' in this case" because it 
structured its transactions such that it "was largely the 'acceptor' in the of-
fer-and-acceptance relationship that defines any 'commercial' contracting 
situation."292 The plaintiff asserted that this nonetheless harmed its economic 
interests in the United States.293 
Preventing patent holders from recovering in these circumstances, espe-
cially where patent holders have less market power than the potentially 
infringing offerors, may wholly prevent patent holders from any recovery of 
the cost of their inventions, either through the marketplace or the courts. At 
a minimum, it would require the patent holder to wait for an actual infring-
ing sale before proceeding with suit. This contravenes the purpose of the 
inclusion of the "offer to sell" language in the infringement statute, which 
"protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing activity."294 In these 
circumstances, patent holders' recovery should not be cabined by the appar-
ent morality, or immorality, of infringing offerors' conduct. 
288. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373,1379 (discussing the harm 
to a patent holder by generating economic interest in the invention away from the patent hold-
er). 
289. Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167-68 
(C.O. Cal. 2001). 
290. [d. at 1170. 
291. [d. at 1173. 
292. [d. at 1170 n.45. 
293. /d. at 1169 n.43. 
294. [d. at 1171. 
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B. Criminal Concepts oj Mens Rea Do Not Realistically Describe the 
"Intent" Element in Patent Infringement Cases 
35 
Concepts of fault in tort law do not realistically describe the intent ele-
ment in patent infringement cases.295 That is, "[n]o one sets out with the 
goal of infringing a patent."296 While a competitor may intend to copy a 
rival's patented product, this is not to say that the competitor wishes to 
infringe its rival's patent. "[O]ne would expect the converse to be closer to 
reality."297 A competitor's knowledge that a rival's design is patented would 
make the competitor less desirous to infringe the rival's patent.29R 
This argument applies with even more force in the criminal context. 
One of the hallmarks of criminal mental states, similar to intent in intention-
al torts, is the requirement that the defendant intended not only to commit 
the prohibited physical act, but also intended to bring about a particular 
consequence of that act. As an example, the Model Penal Code's definition 
of the mental state "purposefully" requires two elements: (1) a conscious 
object to engage in the prohibited conduct and (2) an awareness of the cir-
cumstances of his conduct or a belief or hope that they exist.299 Thus, a 
person who consciously chooses to engage in prohibited conduct, but is 
unaware that his conduct will have a particular harmful consequence, does 
not possess a purposeful mens rea. This is not true for purposeful conduct; 
the Model Penal Code requires this two-part application of intent for every 
criminal offense.3OO 
Yet this analysis should have little application in cases of indirect patent 
infringement. First, it is doubtful that anyone wishes to perform acts that 
"actively induce" or "contribute" to another's patent infringement. Rather, 
an inducer would wish, in reality, only that an inducee perform the attendant 
physical act giving rise to infringement but would remain wholly agnostic as 
to whether or not the inducee's act infringed a patent. All else being equal, 
there is little to be gained by downstream users infringing a patent. Second, 
without engaging in an analysis of patents in the pertinent art, it is unlikely 
that an accused infringer would be "aware" that an inducee's activities in-
fringe the asserted patent.30l And even with an analysis, it is unlikely the 
295. See Rantanen, supra note 269, at 1613-14, 1631-32. 
296. Id. at 1613. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a). 
300. See id. § 2.02(1) ("[AJ person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material 
element of the offense."). 
301. An accused infringer may become aware of the asserted patent, however, if the 
patent holder informs the accused infringer of the existence of his patent. Yet, as patent hold-
ers increasingly assert patents as an integral part of business strategy, as opposed to a simple 
protection of extant property rights, such communications have become increasingly suspect. 
See Ted Sichel man, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in "Patent Bullying", in PERSPECTIVES 
ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER (Michael Abramowicz, John Duffy & F. Scott Kieff eds., 
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accused infringer would possess a "belief or hope" that the patent would be 
infringed. 
Just as mental states in intentional torts only poorly parallel indirect pa-
tent infringement, criminal concepts of mens rea also do not accurately 
reflect the reality of indirect patent infringement. No one consciously 
"wishes" for a patent to be infringed, even if he or she is aware of the exist-
ence of a related patent. Treating patent infringement like criminal conduct 
in this regard serves no discernible purpose. 
C. Grafting Criminal Concepts of Mens Rea onto Civil Statutes 
Continues a General Trend of Improperly Equating 
Civil and Criminal Law Concepts 
Global-Tech also continues a general trend of improperly equating civil 
and criminal law concepts. Several courts have cited Global-Tech as support 
for importing criminal law concepts of mens rea into civil cases that have 
nothing to do with patents. In Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., the 
court relied on Global-Tech to import a willful blindness element in a 
trademark cancellation claim, alleging that the trademark holder's attorney 
was "willful[ly] blind" in listing goods on the defendant's trademark appli-
cation that it did not use or intend to use in the future. 302 In United States ex 
rei. Saltzman v. Textron Systems Corp., the district court, in considering the 
level of knowledge required to state a claim under the Federal False Claims 
Act,303 "assume[d] that a showing of willful blindness would satisfy the 
knowledge requirement for a false claim," and cited Global-Tech.304 In addi-
tion, a bankruptcy court hearing the case, In re Dreier LLP, at least partially 
leaned on Global-Tech to graft a willful blindness element onto a fraudulent 
transfer claim.305 While the propriety of using willful blindness in these in-
stances should be analyzed on a statute-by-statute basis,306 the rush to use 
Global-Tech to import criminal mens rea into civil statutes is disquieting. 
2011) (presenting a case study where "large, established companies that threaten or institute 
costly patent infringement actions of dubious merit against smaller companies, usually in 
order to suppress competition or gamer licensing fees"); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, 
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (cal-
culating the large number of invalid, but asserted, patents); Rantanen, supra note 269, at 1631 
("Receiving a letter from a competitor proclaiming the obviousness of infringement seems like 
thin grounds on which to base the conclusion of "substantial certainty" of infringement."). 
302. Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 
2011) 
303. 31 U.S.c. §§ 3729-33 (2011). 
304. United States ex rei. Saltzman v. Textron Sys. Corp., CIV.A. No. 09-11985-RGS, 
20 II WL 2414207 at *4 n.8 (D. Mass. June 9, 20 II). 
305. In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391,451 n.54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 201 I). 
306. For example, willful blindness may be an appropriate moniker for knowledge in 
federal False Claims Act cases because, unlike patent infringement litigation, the False Claims 
Act does not solely concern itself with pecuniary harms. 
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Global-Tech does not appear to be the progenitor of such conflation, but 
only a point in a greater trend of cross-contamination between discrete con-
cepts in criminal and civil law that use similar terms. Courts have long raced 
to find easy analogies to difficult statutes. This has demonstrably occurred 
in the immigration context, an area of law that has struggled mightily to 
identify its proper place in the civil-criminal spectrum.307 In Kungys v. United 
States, for example, the Supreme Court derived a definition of the term "mate-
rial," as in a "material misrepresentation" of facts to immigration authorities, 
wholly from criminal law conceptions of perjury or concealment.308 The Court 
never addressed whether differing concerns in civil-immigration violations 
and criminal perjury prosecutions should mandate different results. 
This happens, too, even where the phrase in the civil statute is inten-
tionally broader than its criminal twin. For example, in some civil law 
statutes allowing recovery for unwanted "sexual contact," such as sexual 
assault, the definition of "sexual contact" is ambiguous.309 Commentators 
focusing on the intersection of criminal and civil law in the sexual assault 
context have seized on this ambiguity and cautioned against the "risk that 
new statutes designed to aid sexual assault victims will import existing 
criminal law problems into civil cases."3!O A less-than-contemplative confla-
tion of terms between the two areas of law may wrongly whittle away some 
of "the most significant advantages that victims enjoy in tort as opposed to 
criminal fora."3!! 
Lastly, the conflation of mens rea in civil and criminal statutes routinely 
occurs in hybrid statutory schemes. Principally, doctrines requiring 
consistency in statutory interpretation force such intermingling.312 But the 
goals of criminal as opposed to civil arenas do not always align. Most 
famously, the Supreme Court's equating the term "pattern" in civil and 
criminal aspects of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act in 
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. did not address whether the 
"patterns of racketeering" sought to be criminally punished should differ 
from the "patterns of racketeering" sought to be civilly enforced.313 It is fair 
to suggest that principles of statutory construction and concepts of 
congressional intent outweigh whatever nuances are normatively desired 
from a perfectly composed anti-racketeering statute. But the Court's failure 
307. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifur-
cated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-c.L. L. REV. 289 (2008). 
308. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). 
309. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61 B-I(2) (West 2005). 
310. Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil 
Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 73 (2006). 
311. ld. at 72. 
312. See generally Jonathan Marx, Note, How to Construe a Hybrid Statute, 93 VA. L. 
REv. 235 (2007) (discussing courts' reluctance against dual construction, even where the crim-
inal side of a hybrid statute includes a mens rea that its civil counterpart does not). 
313. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,236 (1989). 
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to at least mention these potential differences in H.l. Inc. speaks of a greater 
movement to remain silent as criminal mental states expand into civil areas. 
D. Courts Should Define Mental State Elements in Civil Statutes 
According to Their Purposes 
The kaleidoscope of terms used to describe mens rea well addresses the 
need of mental states in criminal law. They often reconcile competing con-
cerns: they work to ascribe a level of moral culpability to the defendant, 
separate those acts requiring civil restitution from those precipitating crimi-
nal punishment, and insulate otherwise innocently acting defendants from 
the maw of the criminal process. 314 But many civil statutes do not have such 
goals. Blindly using criminal mental state definitions in the civil context 
seems to poorly further the goals of civil statutes. 
In interpreting the mental state requirement for civil statutes, courts 
should consider those statutes' goals. Numerous civil statutes-including 
many provisions of the patent infringement statute-have no mental state 
requirement at all.3I5 The constitutional due process concerns with requiring 
defendants to possess "evil-meaning minds"316 before imposing liability for 
their acts are absent in the civil context.317 The issues of morality, fairness, 
guilt, and innocence that are so deeply interwoven into criminal mens rea 
analysis do not always come to bear in the civil context. Direct infringe-
ment, in particular, would suffer from treatment as criminal conduct. It has 
no mental state requirement and is designed simply to compensate patent 
holders for infringing uses. And it is unlike other property torts in that it has 
little moral or utilitarian basis.3lg The concern voiced in Morissette that 
"wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal"319 would be misplaced in 
the direct infringement context. Applying criminal mental states to strict 
liability civil statutes, such as that governing direct infringement, risks treat-
ing civil violations as criminal conduct. 
Other civil statutes that do contain mental state requirements seek to ef-
fectuate very different policy goals than those in the criminal context. In 
employment discrimination actions under Title VII, for example, a plaintiff 
seeking to prove her employer's discriminatory motivation must show that 
the employer harbored an "intent to discriminate."32o Yet, "[i]n this context, 
314. See supra Part 11. 
315. See supra notes 135-158 and accompanying text. 
316. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
317. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81,102 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Strict liability 
generally raises due process concerns with respect to criminal, not civil, statutes."). 
318. See supra Part lILA. 
319. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252. 
320. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coli., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2(05) ("The method 
of proving race discrimination by putting forth evidence of discriminatory motivation often is 
called the 'direct' method. A plaintiff proceeding according to the direct method may rely on 
two types of evidence: direct evidence or circumstantial evidence .... Direct evidence is a 
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the language of intention means that a causal link must be found between an 
employment action and the plaintiff's race, sex, or other protected character-
istic-not that a deliberately or consciously discriminatory purpose is 
required."321 Assessing civil employment discrimination under the same ru-
bric as criminal conduct would simply create additional hurdles for 
plaintiffs. Similar heightened standards of proof in the Title VII context 
"do[] not meet the public policy goal of prohibiting discrimination and retal-
iatory discharges."322 
Even civil mental-state requirements seemingly pregnant with criminal 
meaning do not necessarily incorporate the elements of vice associated with 
criminal law. In the bankruptcy context, for example, a debtor cannot dis-
charge a debt stemming from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor 
to another entity or to the property of another entity."323 Despite the fact that 
such a standard appears to be directly lifted from criminal law, "[t]he focus 
of the 'malicious' inquiry is on the debtor's actual knowledge or the reason-
able foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the creditor, not 
on abstract and perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the 
debtor's act."324 To be clear, this is not to say that no civil statutes that incor-
porate mental states do so for reasons traditionally associated with criminal 
enforcement.325 Rather, courts seeking to give gloss to civil statutes contain-
ing mental states should not assume that they do. 
As defining mental states is mainly an issue of statutory interpretation, 
the burden rests on courts to prevent the problems associated with treating 
civil liability as criminal conduct. In interpreting mental states in civil stat-
utes, courts should begin their inquiries by addressing, first, whether and 
why the legislature included a mental state requirement. Courts should re-
member that mental states in the criminal law typically serve very different 
purposes than those in the civil law. While the absence of a mental state in a 
criminal statute may implicate constitutional due process concerns, there are 
no such worries in the civil context. Thus, where a civil liability statute does 
not appear to contain a mental state, courts should be reluctant to read one 
in. 
Second, where a civil statute does appear to contain a mental state re-
quirement, such as "actively induce" in the induced infringement statute, 
'distinct' type of evidence that uniquely reveals 'intent to discriminate[, which] is a mental 
state.' ") (internal citations omitted). 
321. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Moti-
vation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1922 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
322. Kotewa v. Living Independence Network Corp., No. CV05-426-S-EJL, 2007 WL 
433544, at *7 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007). 
323. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2011). 
324. In re Musgrave, BAP Nos. CO-IO-049, 08-25165, 2011 WL 312883, at *11 (lOth 
Cir. Feb. 2, 2011). 
325. See supra notes 134-148 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of morali-
ty embodied in civil securities violations). 
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courts should begin their inquiry by characterizing its purpose (e.g., remedi-
al, deterrence, regulatory, etc.). Whatever the statute's purpose, an 
interpretation of its attendant mental state should further that goal. Interpre-
tations of mental states in remedial statutes, for example, should likely be 
given wider berth than their regulatory counterparts. 
And lastly, where a civil statute appears to include a mental state from 
the criminal law, courts should pause. Courts should not simply assume that 
the legislature used words similar to those in the criminal law to import their 
definitions-or the baggage that comes with them. Irrespective of the simi-
larity of terms, courts should still assess if the purposes of the statute are 
different from those in criminal law, such as regulation rather than moral 
condemnation. Once this purpose is elucidated, courts should ensure that the 
contours of the particular statute's mental state requirement align with its 
purpose. While, absent Congressional action, it may be too late to effect 
meaningful change in the interpretation of mental states for patent infringe-
ment, this three-part method of statutory interpretation would prevent 
construing civil liability as criminal conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The mens rea requirement in criminal law stands in bold relief to the 
mental state requirements in civil law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court vio-
lated this longstanding separation between criminal and civil mental states 
in its decision in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A. There, the Court im-
ported the criminal mens rea element of willful blindness into the 
inducement provision of the patent infringement statute. This importation 
failed to take account of the different purposes behind mens rea in criminal 
actions-to ascribe moral culpability, to separate crime from tort, and to 
shield innocently acting defendants from punishment-from the economic 
purposes of the patent infringement statute. Global-Tech does not advance 
the economically remedial goals of patent infringement, and the Court's far-
reaching language suggests that such an interpretive technique will have 
consequences outside of patent law. 
Courts should take Global-Tech as a moral. Importing criminal concepts 
of mens rea into the patent statute disallows legitimately harmed patent 
holders a form of economic recovery. More generally, importing criminal 
concepts of mens rea into civil statutes continues a general trend of improp-
erly equating civil and criminal law concepts. Recognizing this, courts 
should develop an appropriate interpretive scheme to address mental state 
requirements in civil statutes. Such a scheme should principally consist of 
three canons: (l) courts should avoid importing a mental state in a civil stat-
ute where none appears to be present; (2) where a mental state does appear 
to be present, courts should characterize the purpose of the statute in guid-
ing an appropriate interpretation; and (3) even where a civil mental state 
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uses familiar language from the criminal law, courts should avoid import-
ing a criminal law concept of mens rea unless the purposes of the civil 
statute are similar to the moral and protective purposes found in criminal 
law. This interpretive technique would prevent other areas of civil law 
from what happened in Global-Tech: the treatment of patent infringement 
as criminal conduct. 

